[In the following essay, "restorationist" refers to the restoration of capitalism. -- YM]
From www.ft-ci.org
50 years after the Revolution: Where are the politics of Raúl and the leadership of the Cuban Communist Party leading?
By Eduardo Molina
Thursday, January 22, 2009
The fiftieth anniversary of M26's [Fidel's 26th of July Movement] entering Havana was remembered in a sober manner. The Cuban government invited "family celebrations" without mass rallies or public appearances by Fidel (which caused new speculations in the press about his health). Days before, in his December 27 speech in front of the Asamblea del Poder Popular (1), Raúl Castro had sketched important guidelines about the plans of the Cuban leadership, reaffirming a direction that calls into question the very future of the Revolution.
"People should feel the necessity of working to meet their needs"
Under this slogan, Raúl Castro announced an austerity policy that will affect the workers and their conquests; he enlarged the spaces for "private initiative" (as in agriculture), and he also attempted to spur on and discipline the bureaucracy. Amidst a campaign against [!] "wage equality," his justification was that "if there is no pressure, if the necessity to work to meet my needs does not exist" ... "in order to go on gradually solving the distortions existing in the wage system, we must continue eliminating undue gratuities and excessive subsidies." In addition, he confirmed the raising of the "retirement age" and "the need to increase the number of those who engage in work, its productivity and efficiency." In short, a policy for increasing productivity with the stimulus of differentiation in wages and reducing subsidies that represent a form of "social wages" covering a large part of the basic needs of the people. He was also pleased by the advances in "continuing to put idle lands in the hands of those who are able and willing to make them be productive," whether individual campesinos, cooperatives or companies. Raúl had already announced that state-owned industry will provide materials for individuals to build with, a decision that recognizes the inability of the bureaucracy to solve the dramatic problem of housing (aggravated by the hurricanes Gustav and Ike in 2008) and, in fact, opens new spaces for "private initiative" and the black market.
Finally, Raúl insisted that "there will be no backing down on the intention of strengthening institutions, discipline and order in all the country's spheres," and he announced the "creation of the General Comptroller's Office of the Republic, as a hierarchically superior organ," in an attempt to bring order and introduce new administrative methods in the chaotic state-sector management. These measures are registered in the general direction of pro-market reforms, adopted by Fidel during the "special period" (2) and the years of the 1990's. (Certainly, Cuba, a small state besieged by imperialism and isolated, could find itself forced to make certain concessions, but these retreats must be limited, and they require as a counterbalance, the masses' revolutionary power and control. In the hands of the bureaucratic caste, they [these retreats] push towards decomposition of the nationalized economy, they nurture social differentiation with "newly rich people" and privileged strata, and they strengthen the restorationist tendencies that reside in the Castroist bureaucracy itself.) Now the orientation proposed by Raúl Castro aims at deepening that course.
New, stormy winds
This "desperate gamble" is a bureaucratic response to the accumulation of enormous economic, social and political contradictions. The economic slowdown, after several years of growth (with a record 12% in 2006), is making itself felt with the first effects of the world crisis. The price of Cuban nickel fell by 40% in 2008, and the prices of fish, sugar and other exports also fell. This is in addition to the high cost of imported oil and food and the serious devastation by the three big hurricanes of the year, that left losses of around $10 billion and half a million damaged dwellings.
Social tensions are growing. While the chronic underproduction of food and consumer goods, corruption, increasing inequality, affect the workers and groups of the people that depend on incomes in common pesos to live and can hardly complete their needs beyond the ration booklet, the privileged groups (high-level bureaucrats, the "newly rich", and in general, those who benefited from the reforms, the basis of the growing restorationist tendencies) are improving their situation, gaining access to the free market ruled by the convertible peso and pressing for greater consumption (recently, buying cell phones, computers and other goods was permitted as a gesture to these strata).
The political problems of the succession led by Raúl are accumulating. Absent Fidel's leadership, his brother must still achieve political authority, consensus among the different wings of the bureaucracy and legitimacy in front of the population, in order to apply his plans. Raúl has support among the old cadres of the FAR (revolutionary armed forces) that he led for half a century and that are a key economic institution (they run a collection of 700 enterprises and many of the associations with foreign capital) and as a prop of the state. But he has to contain the "moderate" influences (that prefer more speed in the pro-capitalist reforms and certainly a political "opening"), and he has replaced the "talibans" (some young leaders that accompanied Fidel in the last period). The conflicts in the heights are continuing, and at times they are expressed in a muted manner in the press and in some academic discussions about the course to follow. On the other hand, the deterioration of the institutions, "popular power," the National Assembly, and the Cuban Communist Party, is increasing, and social dissatisfaciton was expressed, for instance, in the "self-critical" campaign of 2007, where 1,200,000 complaints were presented, in the scepticism of youth, and in the criticisms and debates among intellectuals and artists. Because of all that, the call for the Sixth Congress of the Cuban Communist Party ("frozen" for a decade), could be seen as an attempt to provide an outlet for internal conflicts and achieve political support for the application of plans that will attack the social conquests more directly.
The "Cuban road" to disaster
Those who govern Cuba appear increasingly interested in the Chinese and Vietnamese "models," with their combination of pro-captialist economic measures and iron political control by the "communist" bureaucracy, as a guarantee of their own interests. Paradoxically, not only the internal contradictions drive them in that direction, but the better international scene for Cuba, that has improved relations with nearly all of Latin America and has a close alliance with Venezuela, encourages a greater economic opening. The approach to Lula opens the possibiity of Brazilian investments. Besides this, it is possible that the Obama administration will revise aspects of the traditional US policy of blockade and intransigence. But imperialism, with the concurrence of the "friendly governments" of the region and even of the Miami gusano bourgeoisie, will not fail to take advantage of Cuba's difficulties and press for speeding up the "transition" to capitalism (including the political opening for pro-bourgeois forces). The "Cuban road" of gradual pro-market reforms is increasingly eroding the bases of the nationalized economy and nurturing the restorationist counter-revolution. It can only lead to the precipice of capitalist restoration and recolonization by imperialism.
A program of defense of the revolution
The Latin American reformist left backs Castroism without further ado, although its program leads to disaster. Still worse, certain "progressives" and populists would like to hurry the reforms, in accordance with their own thesis that socialist revolution is now "surpassed," and there is now no other solution for Cuba than "more markets" and a "democratic opening," that is, capitalism with bourgeois democracy. There are those on the left who consider capitalist restoration already completed (like the LIT-CI), or that Cuba never was a workers' state (even bureaucratized), which leads to serious programatic and political errors. On the other hand, we reaffirm the validity of a program of political revolution (combining the economic-social tasks that the pro-market measures have discounted) that proceeds from the defense of the conquests of the Revolution that still remain, to bring a revolutionary workers' solution to the agonizing situation of the masses and confront the bureaucracy in all its branches, by fighting for a government of workers' and campesinos' councils and guiding Cuba on the road of international revolution, as had been outlined in 1959.
As part of this program, we propose:
End the US blockade
Review all the "pro-market reforms" in a plan that was democratically decided upon by the workers, in order that the economy can again be based on the needs of workers and campesinos
Down with the bureaucracy with its privileges
For a regime of full workers' democracy, with complete freedom of organization in work centers and legality for those anti-capitalist political tendencies that defend the Revolution
No confidence in negotiations with Obama or the EU; no confidence in the bourgeois "friendly governments" of Latin America, to which Castroism offers political support. The future of Cuba is connected to being a support for anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist mobilization for the Federation of Socialist Republics of Latin America
Notes:
(1) The speech can be read on www.cubanet and other official pages.
(2) The sharp crisis signified by the break of ties with the USSR in dissolution and the isolation promoted by imperialism. See Estrategia Internacional 20 (2003) and the supplement Claves 1 of LVO (2008).
From www.ft-ci.org
50 years after the Revolution: Where are the politics of Raúl and the leadership of the Cuban Communist Party leading?
By Eduardo Molina
Thursday, January 22, 2009
The fiftieth anniversary of M26's [Fidel's 26th of July Movement] entering Havana was remembered in a sober manner. The Cuban government invited "family celebrations" without mass rallies or public appearances by Fidel (which caused new speculations in the press about his health). Days before, in his December 27 speech in front of the Asamblea del Poder Popular (1), Raúl Castro had sketched important guidelines about the plans of the Cuban leadership, reaffirming a direction that calls into question the very future of the Revolution.
"People should feel the necessity of working to meet their needs"
Under this slogan, Raúl Castro announced an austerity policy that will affect the workers and their conquests; he enlarged the spaces for "private initiative" (as in agriculture), and he also attempted to spur on and discipline the bureaucracy. Amidst a campaign against [!] "wage equality," his justification was that "if there is no pressure, if the necessity to work to meet my needs does not exist" ... "in order to go on gradually solving the distortions existing in the wage system, we must continue eliminating undue gratuities and excessive subsidies." In addition, he confirmed the raising of the "retirement age" and "the need to increase the number of those who engage in work, its productivity and efficiency." In short, a policy for increasing productivity with the stimulus of differentiation in wages and reducing subsidies that represent a form of "social wages" covering a large part of the basic needs of the people. He was also pleased by the advances in "continuing to put idle lands in the hands of those who are able and willing to make them be productive," whether individual campesinos, cooperatives or companies. Raúl had already announced that state-owned industry will provide materials for individuals to build with, a decision that recognizes the inability of the bureaucracy to solve the dramatic problem of housing (aggravated by the hurricanes Gustav and Ike in 2008) and, in fact, opens new spaces for "private initiative" and the black market.
Finally, Raúl insisted that "there will be no backing down on the intention of strengthening institutions, discipline and order in all the country's spheres," and he announced the "creation of the General Comptroller's Office of the Republic, as a hierarchically superior organ," in an attempt to bring order and introduce new administrative methods in the chaotic state-sector management. These measures are registered in the general direction of pro-market reforms, adopted by Fidel during the "special period" (2) and the years of the 1990's. (Certainly, Cuba, a small state besieged by imperialism and isolated, could find itself forced to make certain concessions, but these retreats must be limited, and they require as a counterbalance, the masses' revolutionary power and control. In the hands of the bureaucratic caste, they [these retreats] push towards decomposition of the nationalized economy, they nurture social differentiation with "newly rich people" and privileged strata, and they strengthen the restorationist tendencies that reside in the Castroist bureaucracy itself.) Now the orientation proposed by Raúl Castro aims at deepening that course.
New, stormy winds
This "desperate gamble" is a bureaucratic response to the accumulation of enormous economic, social and political contradictions. The economic slowdown, after several years of growth (with a record 12% in 2006), is making itself felt with the first effects of the world crisis. The price of Cuban nickel fell by 40% in 2008, and the prices of fish, sugar and other exports also fell. This is in addition to the high cost of imported oil and food and the serious devastation by the three big hurricanes of the year, that left losses of around $10 billion and half a million damaged dwellings.
Social tensions are growing. While the chronic underproduction of food and consumer goods, corruption, increasing inequality, affect the workers and groups of the people that depend on incomes in common pesos to live and can hardly complete their needs beyond the ration booklet, the privileged groups (high-level bureaucrats, the "newly rich", and in general, those who benefited from the reforms, the basis of the growing restorationist tendencies) are improving their situation, gaining access to the free market ruled by the convertible peso and pressing for greater consumption (recently, buying cell phones, computers and other goods was permitted as a gesture to these strata).
The political problems of the succession led by Raúl are accumulating. Absent Fidel's leadership, his brother must still achieve political authority, consensus among the different wings of the bureaucracy and legitimacy in front of the population, in order to apply his plans. Raúl has support among the old cadres of the FAR (revolutionary armed forces) that he led for half a century and that are a key economic institution (they run a collection of 700 enterprises and many of the associations with foreign capital) and as a prop of the state. But he has to contain the "moderate" influences (that prefer more speed in the pro-capitalist reforms and certainly a political "opening"), and he has replaced the "talibans" (some young leaders that accompanied Fidel in the last period). The conflicts in the heights are continuing, and at times they are expressed in a muted manner in the press and in some academic discussions about the course to follow. On the other hand, the deterioration of the institutions, "popular power," the National Assembly, and the Cuban Communist Party, is increasing, and social dissatisfaciton was expressed, for instance, in the "self-critical" campaign of 2007, where 1,200,000 complaints were presented, in the scepticism of youth, and in the criticisms and debates among intellectuals and artists. Because of all that, the call for the Sixth Congress of the Cuban Communist Party ("frozen" for a decade), could be seen as an attempt to provide an outlet for internal conflicts and achieve political support for the application of plans that will attack the social conquests more directly.
The "Cuban road" to disaster
Those who govern Cuba appear increasingly interested in the Chinese and Vietnamese "models," with their combination of pro-captialist economic measures and iron political control by the "communist" bureaucracy, as a guarantee of their own interests. Paradoxically, not only the internal contradictions drive them in that direction, but the better international scene for Cuba, that has improved relations with nearly all of Latin America and has a close alliance with Venezuela, encourages a greater economic opening. The approach to Lula opens the possibiity of Brazilian investments. Besides this, it is possible that the Obama administration will revise aspects of the traditional US policy of blockade and intransigence. But imperialism, with the concurrence of the "friendly governments" of the region and even of the Miami gusano bourgeoisie, will not fail to take advantage of Cuba's difficulties and press for speeding up the "transition" to capitalism (including the political opening for pro-bourgeois forces). The "Cuban road" of gradual pro-market reforms is increasingly eroding the bases of the nationalized economy and nurturing the restorationist counter-revolution. It can only lead to the precipice of capitalist restoration and recolonization by imperialism.
A program of defense of the revolution
The Latin American reformist left backs Castroism without further ado, although its program leads to disaster. Still worse, certain "progressives" and populists would like to hurry the reforms, in accordance with their own thesis that socialist revolution is now "surpassed," and there is now no other solution for Cuba than "more markets" and a "democratic opening," that is, capitalism with bourgeois democracy. There are those on the left who consider capitalist restoration already completed (like the LIT-CI), or that Cuba never was a workers' state (even bureaucratized), which leads to serious programatic and political errors. On the other hand, we reaffirm the validity of a program of political revolution (combining the economic-social tasks that the pro-market measures have discounted) that proceeds from the defense of the conquests of the Revolution that still remain, to bring a revolutionary workers' solution to the agonizing situation of the masses and confront the bureaucracy in all its branches, by fighting for a government of workers' and campesinos' councils and guiding Cuba on the road of international revolution, as had been outlined in 1959.
As part of this program, we propose:
End the US blockade
Review all the "pro-market reforms" in a plan that was democratically decided upon by the workers, in order that the economy can again be based on the needs of workers and campesinos
Down with the bureaucracy with its privileges
For a regime of full workers' democracy, with complete freedom of organization in work centers and legality for those anti-capitalist political tendencies that defend the Revolution
No confidence in negotiations with Obama or the EU; no confidence in the bourgeois "friendly governments" of Latin America, to which Castroism offers political support. The future of Cuba is connected to being a support for anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist mobilization for the Federation of Socialist Republics of Latin America
Notes:
(1) The speech can be read on www.cubanet and other official pages.
(2) The sharp crisis signified by the break of ties with the USSR in dissolution and the isolation promoted by imperialism. See Estrategia Internacional 20 (2003) and the supplement Claves 1 of LVO (2008).
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